Proclus Diadochus
(412-485 A.D.)

Proclus' own view of evil:

Evil is twofold: on the one hand, pure evil on its own, unmixed with the good; and on the other hand, evil that is not pure nor unmixed with the nature of the good. For the good too [is twofold]: on the one hand, that which is primarily good and as it were the good itself, and nothing else but good— it is neither intellect nor intelligence nor real being: on the other hand, the good that is mixed with other things. And the latter sometimes is not mixed with privation, whereas elsewhere it does have such a mixture. For that which intermittently participates in the primarily good is manifestly entwined with the nongood. Indeed, the same holds for being itself and the nature of being: in the higher realm being is really being and merely being, but in the last being, being is somehow mixed with non-being. For take that which in one respect is, but in another is not, that which at times is, but is not for countless times, that which is this but is not all other things: how could one say that it is, rather than that it is not, when it is completely filled with non-being. (8.5-19)
    And non-being itself, too [is twofold]: on the one hand, that which absolutely does not exist— it is beyond the lowest nature, whose being is accidental— as it is unable to exist either in itself or even accidentally, for that which does not exist at all does not exist at all does not in some respect exist, in another not. On the other hand, [there is] non-being that is together with being, whether you call it privation of being or 'otherness'. The former [i.e. absolute non-being] is in all respects non-being, whereas the latter [i.e. relative non-being] is in the higher realm 'not less than being', as the Eleatic Stranger asserts, but when it is present among the things that sometimes are and sometimes are notl it is weaker than being, but nonetheless even then it is somehow dominated by being. (8.20-29)
    Hence, if someone were to ask whether non-being is or is not, our answer would be that what absolutely does not exist and has no share whatever in being has absolutely no being: however, we would concede to the questioner that what somehow is not, should be counted among beings. (9.1-4)
    The same reasoning, then, holds for evil, since this is twofold too: on the one hand, that which is exclusively evil; on the other hand, that which is not [exclusively evil], but is mixed with the good. We will rank the former beyond that which absolutely does not exist, inasmuch as the good is beyond being, and the latter among beings, for, because of the mediation of the good, it can no longer remain deprived of being and because of its being it cannot remain deprived of the good. Indeed, it is both being and good. And that which is in all respects evil, being a falling off and as it were a departure from the first good, is of course also deprived of being: for how could it have an entrance into beings if it could not participate in the good? But that which is not in all respects evil, is on the one hand 'contrary' to some good, though not to the good in general; on the other hand, it is ordered and made good because of the pre-eminence of the wholes that are good. And it is evil for those things which it opposes, but depends on other things [i.e. the wholes] as something good. For it is not right that evil oppose the wholes, but all things ought to follow in accordance with justice or not exist at all. (9.4-19)
    Therefore, Plato in the Timaeus is right in saying that in accordance with the will of the demiurge, 'all things are good and nothing is bad'. In his discussions with the geometer, however, he contends that 'evil things cannot possibly cease to exist' and that by necessity they have come to exist among beings. For all things are made good by the will of the Father and, with respect to his productive activity, none of the things that are or come to be are evil. However, when he distinguishes degrees in nature he does not escape the consequence that there is evil for particular things, evil which destroys the good [in them]. (10.1-7)
    It is the same with darkness: darkness that is completely unmixed with its contrary and [utterly] deprived of light has no being; but darkness that is produced in light and limited by it from all sides, belongs to beings. And for the sun nothing is dark, for even to darkness it imparts a weak clarity; for the air, however, darkness is a privation of the light that exists in it. Thus, all things are good to the father of all, and there is evil in those things that are not capable of remaining established in complete accordance with the good; for this reason evil is 'necessary', as we have said earlier. (10.8-14)
    In what sense evil exists and in what sense it does not is clear from our argument. For both those who assert that all things are good, and those who deny this, are right in one respect and wrong in another. Indeed, it is true that all beings are, but non-being, too, is interwoven with being. Therefore all things are good, since there is no evil that is unadorned and unmixed. And also evil exists, namely, for the things for which indeed there is evil: it exists, namely, for the things for which indeed there is evil: it exists for the things that do not have a nature that is disposed to remain in the good in an unmixed way. (10.15-21)

Where does evil exist?: Is there evil in the gods?

    After these questions we should examine in which [class] of beings, and how, and whence evil has come to exist. For, as we have seen, to being also belongs the nature of evil. So we should start from the beginning and explore, to the best of our abilities, where there is evil. (11.1-4)
    The gods, their reigns, numbers, and orders have the first portion of being, or rather they possess all beings and the intellective essence. Riding mounted on this essence, they produce all things, preside over all things, proceed to all things, are present in all things without being mixed with them, and adorn all things in a transcendent manner; neither is their intelligence hindered by their providential activities, nor is their parental authority weakened by the purity of their intelligence: for their intellective activity is identical with their being, and they have providence because of their goodness and because of their fertile power. This power does not want to remain in itself, but as it were brings forth that which the gods are allowed to engender, that is to say, all beings, all the classes hat are superior to the souls, the souls themselves, and whatever may be on a lower level of being than the latter. (11.5-15)
    In fact, the gods themselves are beyond all beings, and they are the measures of being, since all being is contained in them as is numbe in the monads. Beings, then, proceed from the gods, some beings remaining in the gods, other beings falling away from the unity of the gods into a secondary or yet lower nature, according to the principle of degradation. These beings are established in the order of the participating entities, since they depend on the goodness of the real gods. The gods, however, exist in accordance wiht the good itself and the measure of all things; they are nothing else but the henads of beings, their measure and goodness, their summits, if you like, and as it were the 'flowers and supersubstantial lights', and everything like that; they allow participation on the level of true being and the first substance, and they produce by themselves all good and fine things, the intermediate things, and whatever kind of beings there are. Suppose someone asked us about the light which the king of all that is visible, the god who has a rank analogous to the good, spreads over the whole world, is this light in itself susceptible of darkness or not? There would be many ways in which we could lead the questioner through circuitous arguments to reject such ideas, now celebrating the simplicity of its nature, then its continuity with its generating principle, then again something else. In the same manner we must speak about the gods. Perhaps we should not raise questions while remaining in the divine abodes; however, since we speak to simpler mnds as well, we must use many examples from both poetry and conversations that may imbue the souls of a young audience. We should explain then in which way what is called evil does not exist in the gods. (11.16-37)
    We have to remember that the gods adorn all things, that they are lacking in nothing, that they live in complete blessedness, and that life for them means 'to live in abundance'. For we have these ideas about the gods in our thoughts that are not deflected [by lower things] and this is from where we take them. And why speak about the gods? As a matter of fact, even 'souls of good fortune' that acquire intellect 'grow wings' and, having assimilated themselves to gods, remain in the good. In them no evil is present nor will it ever come about. Total mirth, an unharmed life, and a choir of virtues, these things lead such a soul to a superior place, 'to a banquet, a feast', far away from the evils of this world, not for the purpose of vanquishing these evils, but so as to introduce in them, with the help of the gods, an order accoding to justice; these souls remain themselves in the gods. But when they are filled with the contemplation of the higher world, they become sated with their food, which is for them the beginning of excess, worldly pleasures and overboldness, but not yet pure evil. If then, even in the case of souls that are divine there is no evil, how could there be evil in the gods themselves? there is no warmth in snow, as they say, nor cold in fire. Hence there is no evil in the gods either, nor is there anything of a divine nature in evil things. (12.1-15)
    All this must be said for the benefits of those who need it. But one should also keep in mind that for the gods 'to be gods' means 'to exist in accordance with the good'. For just as [particular] souls come from the universal soul and particular intellects from the entirely perfect intellect, likewise the very first series of goods, for which being and existence is nothing other than to be one and good, will come from the first good, or rather— if one may so so— from goodness itself, that is, from the henad of everything that is good. Similarly, for the particular intellects to be and to exist is nothing other than to think, and for the souls it is nothing other than to live. For if all things that proceed from their principle accomplish their procession through likeness and in continuity, then those things that proceed from the first unity are the first henads; and from the one good proceeds the multitude of goods. Now what could still be 'evil' or 'the nature of evil' for those beings that have their existence in accordance with the good? For the good itself does not allow evil. For the good is measure and light, whereas evil is darkness and absence of measure; the former is th cause of all foundation and all power, the latter is without foundation and weak; the former is that which sustains everything, the latter that which corrupts each thing in which it is present, each according to its own rank; for, as we have explained, not everything has the same mode of corruption. (13.1-17)
    Should we say, then, that it is not true that the gods are good, or should we say that they are good but change? This is what happens in particular souls, which always exhibit different types of life. But in so saying we would be affirming something unholy with respect to the very existence of the gods. For that which is congenial with the non-good, is not good— and what is like this is not a god. Neither is that which changes similar to the One, which is better than any activity. For that which, through similarity, is in accordance with the One and eternal stems from what is before eternity, and that which is located in immobile activity derives its existence from that which is beyond the level of primary activity. Hence evil is not in the gods, neither absolutely nor in time. For both eternity and time are wholly posterior to the gods. These are substances and about substances; the gods are prior to substance and beings. Beings proceed from the gods, who are not beings themselves. And a god is whatever is good, whereas [substance and being] is what derives from this, namely true being. (13.18-31)

Different types of evils

    Let us speak nex of the [specific] differences in evil and determine how many they are and what they are. We have said earlier already that one kind of evil is in the souls, another in bodies, and that evil in souls is twofold, one residing in the irrational type of life, the other in reason. Let us repeat once again: there are three things in which evil exists, namely, the particular soul, the image of the soul, and the body of individual beings. Now for the soul that is above, the good consists in being according to intellect— because intellect is prior to it. For the irrational soul it consists in being according to reason— because for each thing being good comes from the thing immediately superior to it. And for the body again it is being in accordance with nature, because nature is the principle of motion and rest for it. If this is the case, it is necessary that evil for the first is being contrary to intellect, as being subcontrary to what is according to intellect; for the second it is being contrary to reason, as in its case being good means being according to reason; and for the third it is being contrary to nature. These three species of evil inhere in the three natures that are liable to weaken because of the decline into partial being. For wholes, as we have often asserted, are in permanent possession of their own good, whereas evil resides down here, I mean in particular and individual beings; in these latter beings lack of power occurs because of the decline in their very being, as well as an increase of divion, when their union is weakened. (55.1-19)
    In general there is one [type of] evil in souls and another in bodies; of these evils, that in souls is again twofold, with 'disease' on the one hand, and 'foulness' on the other, as the Eleatic Stranger somewhere says. Foulness is 'ignorance' and privation of intellect; disease, on the other hand, is 'discord' inside the soul and deficiency in the life according to reason. In this respect, too, evil will be threefold, and each of these kinds will in its turn be twofold. Foulness indeed differs according to whether it concerns discursive thinking or opinion— as in these cases also the [mode of] cognition is different— and may be either lack of knowledge or lack of skill. And also disease differs according to whether it affects cognitions or impulses (appetites are nt according to reason, just like many of the sense-perceptions and precipitate sense-images). For those whose life consists in practical activity, [disturbance comes about] because of opposing appetites; for those whose life consists in contemplation, the intervention of sense-images destroys the purity and immaterial character of their contemplations. That which is contrary to nature, too, may be twofold: foulness in the body is contrary to nature, as it, too, is a weakness and a deficiency with respect to form; in the case of disease, the order and proportion inherent in the body are dissolved. (56.1-18)
    In so many ways, therefore, is evil to be divided. Since the measures of beings are also to be found in the same three principles— nature, soul, and intellect— likewise unmeasuredness is privation either of the reasons inherent in nature, or of those inherent in soul, or of those inherent in and generated from intellect. for that which imparts order to each thing is better than what is ordered by it primarily— I mean what primarily imparts order to each [of them]. Such is nature in bodies, reason in the irrational kinds of life, and in the rational souls the good that is prior to them. And for images [of souls] [the good] exists because of the superior soul, insofar as all these images also depend on such a soul, or because of that which is an external principle, providing good for the beings over which it exercises its providence. Finally, the good for bodies comes from a particular for some; for others, from a universal nature. (57.1-13)

Providence and evil

    Perhaps womeone may raise the question of how evils can exist and where they come from, given the existence of providence. [For there seem to be only two possibilites:] if there is evil, how will it not stand in the way of that which is providential towards the good? On the other hand, if providence fills the universe, how can there be evil in beings? Some thinkers indeed yield to one of the two lines of reasoning: either they admit that not everything comes from providence, and deny the existence of evil, and maintain that everything comes from providence and the good. And this indeed is a troubling problem. But perhaps one may find a perspective from which both points of view do not conflict. (58.1-8)
    Let us consider first this evil in souls itself: if it were unmixed with its contrary and totally deprived of it, if it were utter darkness and nothing but darkness, then perhaps it would be an obstruction to the works of providence, from which come 'all the good things and nothing bad'. But if, as we have already repeatedly stated, this evil is also good, if it is not an unmixed and absolute evil, but evil in a certain sense and not unqualifiedly evil, then we must not, because of its participation in the good, deny that it exists, nor because of the wickedness that resides in it, deny that all things, including this [evil] itself, are good and become good. (58.9-15)
    After all, saying that god is the cause of all things is not the same as saying that he is the only cause of all things. The former statement is correctm, the latter is not. For intellect, too, is the cause of all things that are posterior to it, and soul of the things that follow it, and nature of bodies and all things pertaining to bodies. Each of these produces in a different way, the one primordially and unitarily, the other eternally, the next by self-movement and the last through necessity. And neither is that which produces intellectively the same as that which is prior to it, nor as that which is posterior qua posterior. If then all things come from providence that it exists and comes to be, why would it be absurd to admit that evil may have a place among beings insofar as it gets its existence from soul? And the same thing will be evil to particular things, but good for the whole. Or rather, is it not the case that even for particular things it will only be evil insofar as it stems from those things themselves, but not evil insofar as it stems from the whole. For not only activity has its goodness from providence, but also the agent. (58.16-29)
    How then is there good in them, I mean in the evils inherent in souls? For only thus does providence keep its credibility and does not leave any of these evils in the soul deprived of itself. Now, these evils, too, must be held to be twofold: some internal, belonging to and affecting the soul itself, for instance in the case of inappropriate impressions or wrong assents or choices that are base in some way; others exterior and manifesting themselves in various actions that are done out of anger or desire. (58.30-35)
    Now, all such things have in many ways good effects. For they happen for the punishment of other beings, and the action performs what is deserved. Moreover, acting badly toward a being that needs suffering is not the same thing as acting badly towards any being whatever. These actions are totally good as well to the one who suffers them as to the one who performs them, insofar as the latter follows the designs of the whole. But insofar as he does not follow those, but performs such an action for his own motives, he does evil, and he gives in to the woes of his soul that are not appropriate to him nor grand. for the sufferer, it is nevertheless the beginning of salvation. For many people conceal the evil which they contrive and which stays inside the soul, and make it [appear] good, as it [really] is shameful and inappropriate, but when the evil is performed its nature becomes evident. This is shown by the repentance and remorse of the soul that reproaches itself, as it were, for the evil deed. In medicine, too, doctors open ulcers and thus make evident the ailment and the inwardly concealed casuse of the disease. [In so doing,] they display an image of the workings of providence, that hands [souls] over to shameful doings and passions in order that they may be freed from their pain, as well as this fostering condition, swollen up with evils, and then begin a better cycle and a better [tuype of] life. (59.1-15)
    And all the internal passions of a soul that make the soul evil possess goodness, in the sense that they always lead the soul towards what is appropriate to it. For it is not possible for the soul to choose the inferior and still remain among superior things. No, the soul will soon be dragged towards darkness and baseness. And not only the actions of the soul, but also its choices, even without action, are punished. For every choice leads the soul towards a state similar [to what has been chosen]. If then anything that is depraved, bas and godless in the soul will bring it to a like condition, the soul will soon have what is good for it, namely that which it deserves accordingly to providence. Such is the law [implanted] in the souls, which guides each soul to what is appropriate to it, one soul projecting [some type of] life, while another attaches itself to things similar to it, this is tantamount to the soul getting either what it deserves, or what is just, [in other words], either what is according to providence, or what is good. (59.16-27)
    If it were the fortune of the souls that act unjustly to remain above— what an awful thing to say!— their choice would in no way exhibit well being. For their choice being nothing but evil, would be utterly godless and unjust. But if the choice removes the soul immediately from the superior realities, then it possesses the good from there, mixed with evil: for every soul by nature strives for that which is superior. Hence, when souls fall, the shamefulness of their life becomes manifest to them. But every soul that does not operate according to intellect necessarily falls, and for some the fall is steeper, for others less, since the choices that they make are different too. (59.28-35)
    But how is the evil inherent in bodies at the same time good? Is it because it is according to nature for the whole, but contrary to nature for the part? Or rather, is it even for the part according to nature insofar as it operates for the benefit of the whole, and contrary to nature when cut from the whole? (60.1-4)
    The evil inherent in bodies, as well, is twofold, one kind existing as foulness, the other as disease— I call foul all things contrary to nature that are not diseases, for monsters, too, are foulnesses of nature. Of these two kinds [let us first consider] foulness. Foulness is in accordance with universal nature, as reason and form are to be found it it, Indeed, in a particular nature there is one rational principle, and what is contrary to it is for this thing against nature, but in universal nature all the rational principles and forms exist naturally. And (1) sometimes one thing only is generated out of one form— for 'man is begotten by man', properly speaking; (2) sometimes many things are generated out of one thing— for of a [certain] figure [there is only] one formula, but [there are] many figures [that exist] in accordance with this formula; (3) sometimes one thing is generated out of many, as in the case of mixtures of matter-related forms— these mixtures seem to be monsters with respect to the individual nature, which desires to be dominated by and exist accrding to a single form; (4) sometimes many things are generated from many things— equality and inequality indeed are in many things. All the forms then, both unmixed and mixed, are according to nature, and depend on the rational principles in nature, that are all from the higher realm. (60.5-20)
    As to disease, they are according to nature in another way, for each of those evils is generated as we say, in a twofold manner, according to both the universal and the particula nature. What is perishable is in accordance with the universal but contrary to the particular nature. For the species into which that which perishes is transformed possesses a rational principle from universal nature, a rational principle that is contrary to the nature of the former thing [i.e. the thing that perishes], and it has this rational principle not from the former thing but from the whole. Insofar as transmutation is from above, it is according to nature. It destroys some things and gives generation to others. Insofar as there is a single rational principle in the thing that changes, it is unnatural— indeed, when it concerns [the thing] as a whole, the change is unnatural, for every being is a whole according to the rational principle inherent in it; however, when it concerns [the thing as] a portion of a whole, it is in accordance with nature, because for the whole it is produced from another thing that is destroyed, and its destruction again leads to the generation of another thing. (60.21-34)
    Hence the evil in bodied is not evil without admixture. But in a sense it is evil, insofar as it does not stem from the higher realm, whereas in another sense it is good, insofar as it stems from natural providence. And in general, how could one say that things that come to be because of the good are completely divested of the good and remain deprived of the nature of the good? For it is not possible that evil exists without taking the appearance of its contrary, the good, since everything is for the sake of the good, even evil itself. But then all things are for the sake of the good, and divinity is not the cause of evils. For never is evil qua evil derived from there; it stems from other causes, which, as we have said, are able to be productive not on account of pwer but on account of weakness. That is the reason, I think, why Plato arranges everything there is around the king of everything, and asserts that everything is because of him, including the things that are not good, for they appear as good and are part of the beings. In the same spirit he names this the cause of evil things. But while it is not the cause of evils only in that they are beings and insofar as each of them is good. (61.1-17)
    Now, if we are right in stating this, all things will be from Providence and evil has its place among beings. Therefore the gods also produce evil, but qua good. The gods know evil, since they possess a unitary knowledge of everything, an undivided knowledge of divisibles, a good knowledge of evils, a unitary knowledge of plurality. For the knowledge of the soul differs from that of intellect, which again differs from that of the gods themselves. For the knowledge of the soul is self-moving, that of intellect is eternal, and that of the gods is ineffable and unitary, knowing and producing everything by the One itself. (61.18-24)